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INVESTIGATING ALTERNATIVES TO RIGHTS: 
THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND 




,Q UHFHQW \HDUV LQ WKH DWWHPSW WR DFKLHYH ´ÀVFDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\µ
governments have decreased social assistance rates, reduced program 
eligibility, and terminated social services. As a result, more and more 
individuals have slipped into poverty. In order to prevent governments 
from cutting these services to below subsistence levels, this paper 
proposes that Canada take steps to achieve constitutional protection of a 
minimum level of assistance. The concept of a constitutionally protected 
minimum level of assistance has been considered. Most recently, 
advocates focused their efforts on achieving constitutional protection 
through the language of rights. However, both through the legislature 
and the judiciary, these efforts have failed. This paper will attempt to 
achieve protection without resorting to the language of rights. It will do 
so by examining the law of Hungary, a country whose Constitutional 
Court used the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, and 
SURSHUW\ SURWHFWLRQ WR ÀQG OHJLVODWLRQ WHUPLQDWLQJ D V\VWHP RI VRFLDO
ZHOIDUHEHQHÀWVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDO
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The most sacred of all laws, the welfare of the people,  
The most irrefragable of all titles, necessity
— Robespierre1
In “On Revolution”, Hannah Arendt discusses the “social question”, 
what she “better and more simply [calls] the existence of poverty”.2 
Arendt describes poverty as:
a state of constant want and acute misery whose ignominy consists in 
its dehumanizing force; poverty is abject because it puts men under 
the absolute dictate of their bodies, that is, under the absolute dictate 
of necessity as all men know it from their most intimate experience 
and outside all speculations. It was under the rule of this necessity 
that the multitude rushed to the assistance of the French Revolution, 
inspired it, drove it onward, and eventually sent it to its doom, for 
this was the multitude of the poor.3
The actual content of freedom, according to Arendt, is “participation 
in public affairs”.4 However, as individuals cannot participate in public 
affairs when they are under the “absolute dictate of their bodies”, free-
dom cannot be achieved while the social question remains unanswered.5 
Thus, satisfaction of the dictate of necessity is not a distraction from 
freedom, as Arendt states.6 It is a pre-condition of freedom. Consequent-
ly, it was in the effort to create the conditions for freedom, and not in 
its abdication, that Robespierre turned his attention to the “rights of the 
Sans-Culottes…dress, food and the reproduction of their species”.7 
In Canada, many individuals, shackled to the “absolute dictate of 
necessity”, have not achieved freedom. In order to create the conditions 
for their freedom, Canada must implement a plan to satisfy the basic 
1 Maximilian Robespierre, Oeuvres, vol. 3 (Paris: Laponneraye, 1840) at 514, cited in Hannah 
Arendt, On Revolution (New York: The Viking Press, 1963) at 54 [Arendt].
2 Arendt, ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid. at 25.
5 Ibid. at 54.
6 Ibid. at 55.
7 Ibid. at 54-55.
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needs of its citizens. This paper proposes that Canada do so through the 
constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance.8 
$PLQLPXPOHYHORIDVVLVWDQFHPD\EHGHÀQHGVLPSO\DVWKHOHYHO
of assistance that is adequate to satisfy the basic needs of the individual 
in matters such as food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary 
social services.9 Though Canadian governments would retain the abil-
ity to restructure the social welfare system, constitutional protection of 
a minimum level of assistance would compel the government to keep 
FHUWDLQ VRFLDO DVVLVWDQFH EHQHÀWV UDWHV DQG SURJUDPV WKRVH GHHPHG
necessary for one’s basic needs) at set levels (the adequate level of as-
sistance).
Achieving constitutional protection of a minimum level of assist-
ance will achieve positive gains for individuals, a vulnerable group, and 
society. Individuals, free from the dictate of necessity, will be able to 
exercise their rights through full participation in democratic discourse.10 
The poverty collective, a vulnerable group, will begin to see its interests 
protected and its rights assured. Through these gains, Canadian society 
will draw closer to the deliberative democratic ideal of “authorship by 
everyone…of the fundamental laws”.11 Given the importance of achiev-
ing protection for individuals, the poverty collective, and Canadian 
democracy, it is essential that this protection occur through a consti-
tutional mechanism. Without constitutional protection, the level of as-
sistance would remain subject to the “potentially destructive reach of 
governments”.12 
8 It is the position of this paper that although individuals in poverty theoretically possess the 
same civil and political rights as all other Canadians, these rights cannot be fully exercised until 
WKHSURWHFWLRQRIVRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFULJKWVVSHFLÀFDOO\WKHULJKWWRDPLQLPXPVWDQGDUGRI
assistance, is achieved. Thus, this paper takes the position that social and economic rights are 
necessary pre-conditions to the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
97KLVGHÀQLWLRQLVEDVHGRQEXWLVQRWLGHQWLFDOWRWKDWFRQWDLQHGLQDUWLFOHRIWKHUniver-
sal Declaration of Human Rights. See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 
(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71 [UDHR].
10 It should be noted that the poor do have some form of political voice, as evidenced by anti-
poverty civil disobedience, constitutional litigation, etc. However, in many instances, those 
speaking for the poor are not the poor themselves. 
11 Frank Michelman, “How Can the People Ever Make Laws? A Critique of Deliberative De-
mocracy”, in James Bohman & William Rehg, eds., Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason 
and Politics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997) at 151 [Michelman].
12 Joel Bakan & David Schneiderman, eds., Social Justice and the Constitution (Ottawa: Carle-
ton University Press, 1992) at 5 [Social Justice].
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It is realistic to expect that without a constitutional bulwark, govern-
ments will continue to cut social services. In recent years, in the attempt 
WR DFKLHYH ´ÀVFDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\µ JRYHUQPHQWV KDYH GHFUHDVHG VRFLDO
assistance rates, reduced program eligibility, and terminated social serv-
ices. As a result, more and more individuals are slipping through the 
cracks into a state of “constant want and acute misery”.13 Constitutional 
protection of a minimum level of assistance must be secured as soon as 
possible.
The concept of a constitutionally protected minimum level of assist-
ance has been considered. Most recently, advocates have focused their 
efforts on achieving constitutional protection through the language of 
rights. However, both through the legislature and the judiciary, these 
efforts have failed. Given the failure of rights to achieve constitutional 
protection of a minimum level of assistance, continuing to force dis-
cussions through the language of rights risks exhausting debate on the 
issue. If the same arguments continue to be raised and rejected, debate 
will slowly grind to a halt. Given the importance of protecting a mini-
mum level of assistance, this is unacceptable.
In the interest of continuing debate, and with the ultimate goal of 
securing constitutional protection for a minimum level of assistance, it 
is necessary to subvert the contemporary reliance on rights, allowing the 
concept of a minimum level of assistance to be presented through other 
institutional instruments. As noted by Wiktor Osiatynski in “On Social 
and Economic Rights: A Needs-Based Approach”:
2QHZD\RIRYHUFRPLQJPDQ\GLIÀFXOWLHVLVWROLPLWWKHDSSOLFDWLRQ
of the language of rights in social and economic spheres. A more 
fruitful approach would be to acknowledge the existence of legitimate 
social, economic, and cultural needs of individuals and groups of 
LQGLYLGXDOV«>W@KHVHQHHGVFDQEHIXOÀOOHGE\DEURDGVSHFWUXPRI
means and instruments. Rights and the mechanisms for enforcement 
of rights will cover only one section of this spectrum.14
In seeking to provide constitutional protection for a minimum level of 
social assistance without resorting to the language of rights, it is helpful 
13 Arendt, supra note 1 at 54.
14 Wiktor Osiatynski, “On Social and Economic Rights: A Needs-Based Approach” online: 
<http://www.newschool.edu/tcds/on%20social%20and%20econ.pdf>.
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to look outside Canada to nations who have managed to accomplish a 
similar task. One such country is Hungary. 
In 1995, the Hungarian government wished to pass legislation ter-
PLQDWLQJDV\VWHPRIVRFLDOZHOIDUHEHQHÀWV,QHYDOXDWLQJWKHFRQVWL-
tutionality of the legislation, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, due 
to particular features of the Hungarian Constitution, could not rely on 
the language of rights. Instead, the Court applied the principles of legal 
FHUWDLQW\ OHJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQV DQG SURSHUW\ SURWHFWLRQ WR ÀQG WKH
legislation unconstitutional. This paper, in seeking to achieve Canadian 
constitutional protection for a minimum level of assistance without re-
sorting to the language of rights, will attempt to apply these principles, 
DVGHÀQHGE\WKH+XQJDULDQ&RQVWLWXWLRQDO&RXUWWR&DQDGLDQMXULVSUX-
dence. 
Through the course of this paper, it will be found that these princi-
ples, so successfully used by the Hungarian Constitutional Court, will 
not, in all probability, achieve the same results in the Canadian context. 
However, though a solution to the social question may not be found 
in the following pages, the act of analysis itself is necessary. In Can-
ada, the attempts to achieve constitutional protection for a minimum 
level of assistance through rights have failed. Given the importance of 
achieving such protection, it is necessary to examine alternatives un-
til a solution is found. Proceeding through rights discourse alone risks 
exhausting debate. As long as solutions and alternatives continue to be 
proposed, examined, and evaluated, the social question will not remain 
unanswered. 
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED 
MINIMUM LEVEL OF ASSISTANCE
1. Individual
As a nation committed to the ideal of democracy and the rule of law, it is 
crucial for Canada to institute constitutional protection for a minimum 
OHYHORIDVVLVWDQFH%\DFKLHYLQJVXFKSURWHFWLRQEHQHÀWVZLOOÁRZWR
individuals, a vulnerable group, and Canadian society. 
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On the individual level, constitutional protection of a minimum 
level of assistance gives Canadians the opportunity to escape from the 
“dehumanizing force” of poverty, achieving a direct and substantial im-
provement in their health and welfare. In addition to helping improve 
an individual’s physical conditions, protection of a minimum level of 
DVVLVWDQFHDFKLHYHVEHQHÀFLDOUHVXOWVIRUDQLQGLYLGXDO·VULJKWV:KHQDQ
LQGLYLGXDOLVXQGHUWKHDEVROXWHGLFWDWHRIQHFHVVLW\VWUXJJOLQJWRÀQGD
hot meal, a bed to sleep in, or a jacket to wear, all of their rights become 
“thin and impoverished”.15 The satisfaction of one’s basic needs is a pre-
condition to the full enjoyment of every right. As such, constitutional 
protection of a minimum level of assistance gives content to the rights 
of an individual. 
Individuals cannot participate in public affairs while they are under 
the “absolute dictate of their bodies”.16 Escape from the dictate of neces-
sity gives individuals the opportunity to participate in public discourse. 
Habermas notes that “citizens can make appropriate use of their public 
DXWRQRP\RQO\ LI«WKH\DUHVXIÀFLHQWO\ LQGHSHQGHQWµ17 The constitu-
tional protection of a minimum level of assistance allows individuals to 
achieve independence from necessity. Having achieved private autono-
my, individuals can make appropriate use of their public autonomy.18 
2. Group
On a group level, constitutional protection of a minimum level of as-
sistance is necessary to secure protection for the poverty collective. The 
SRYHUW\FROOHFWLYHORRVHO\GHÀQHGDVWKRVHLQGLYLGXDOVDQGIDPLOLHVZKR
exist in poverty, exists as a vulnerable group. Without constitutional 
protection, it is likely that their interests will continue to be “overlooked 
and their rights to equal concern and respect violated”.19 
%\GHÀQLWLRQWKHSRYHUW\FROOHFWLYHODFNVUHVRXUFHV$VZHOOWKH\
lack political power. The poverty collective is among those groups in 
15 Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at para. 73 [Eldridge].
16 Arendt, supra note 1 at 54.
17 Jurgen Habermas, “Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights” (1998) 42 Philosophy 
and Soc. Crit. 157 at 161 [Habermas].
18 Ibid.
19 Law Society of British Columbia v. Andrews, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at para. 5 [Andrews].
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society, noted in Andrews, ´ZKRVHQHHGVDQGZLVKHVHOHFWHGRIÀFLDOV
have no apparent interest in attending”.20 Furthermore, the poverty col-
OHFWLYHLVPDGHPRUHYXOQHUDEOHEHFDXVHLWODFNVDQDIÀUPDWLYHLGHQWLW\
Whether poverty is seen as temporary condition brought on by eco-
nomic hardship or the inevitable consequence of immutable personal 
characteristics,21 very few individuals, if any, seek to identify positively 
with the condition of poverty. As a result, the collective is dispersed, 
made even more vulnerable by the desire of its members to disassociate 
from it. 
3. Canadian society
On a societal level, constitutional protection of a minimum level of as-
sistance gives Canada’s laws legitimacy. As well, it brings Canada clos-
er towards the deliberative democratic ideal of full participation. Hab-
ermas notes that “a law may claim legitimacy only if all those possibly 
affected could consent to it after participating in rational discourses”.22 
As noted above, those individuals living under the dictate of necessity 
cannot participate in public affairs. Thus, they are affected by laws to 
which they cannot possibly consent. Until the poverty collective defeats 
the dictate of necessity through the institution of a minimum level of 
assistance, Canada’s laws may not claim legitimacy. 
As well as legitimating the legal-political structure, the constitu-
tional protection of a minimum level of assistance brings Canada closer 
to the deliberative democratic procedural ideal of political rightness, 
GHÀQHGE\WKH́ RQJRLQJSURFHVVRIDXWKRUVKLS«RIWKHODZVE\HYHU\RQH
who stands to be governed by or under them”.23 With their basic needs 
VDWLVÀHGLQGLYLGXDOVFDQFRQWULEXWHWRWKHSURFHVVRIDXWKRUVKLS
20 Ibid. 
21 B. Singh Bolaria & Terry Wotherspoon, “Income Inequality, Poverty, and Hunger”, in B 
Singh Bolaria ed., Social Issues and Contradictions in Canadian Society, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Har-
court Canada, 2000) at 85 [Bolaria].
22 Habermas, supra note 17 at 160.
23 Michelman, supra note 11 at 148-150. 
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II. THE DECLINE OF THE CANADIAN SOCIAL WELFARE STATE
2YHUWKHSDVWWZHQW\ÀYH\HDUV&DQDGLDQJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHVORZO\UH-
treated from the provision of social welfare.24 In the face of international 
economic pressure, and in the desire to pay down debt and draft balanced 
EXGJHWVERWKIHGHUDODQGSURYLQFLDOJRYHUQPHQWVKDYHPDGHVLJQLÀFDQW
cuts to social services. Through the 1980’s, provincial governments, “in 
KDUPRQ\ZLWK2WWDZD>@«IRFXV>HG@RQGHÀFLWUHGXFWLRQDWWKHH[SHQVH
of social spending”.25 In 1990, the Federal Government, “through its 
policy of budgetary restraint”, capped “contributions to social welfare 
programs [previously]…agreed to in cost-sharing arrangements with 
the provinces”.26 In 1995, the Federal Government repealed the protec-
tions in the Canada Assistance Plan. Accompanying that announcement 
was “$7 billion in cuts from the Federal Government to…provinces for 
their social programs”.27 In 2002, the government of British Columbia 
cut rates for social assistance recipients and narrowed the rules govern-
ing eligibility for social assistance recipients, resulting in “many people 
who [were] eligible for social assistance being disentitled”.28 
As a result of these cuts, a greater number of Canadians will expe-
ULHQFH´ÀUVWKDQGWKHUHDOLWLHVRIOLYLQJZLWKWRROLWWOHPRQH\WRROLWWOH
food, clothing, and shelter, and too little hope”.29 Still burdened by debt 
DQGGHÀFLWLWLVOLNHO\WKDW&DQDGLDQJRYHUQPHQWVZLOOFRQWLQXHWRZLWK-
draw funds from social services until they are prohibited from doing so 
by a constitutional safeguard. 
24 Social Justice, supra note 12 at 5.
25 Social Justice, supra note 12 at 5.
26 Social Justice, supra note 12 at 5.
27 Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI), Submissions to the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights by the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI), (16 November 
1998), online: <http://www.equalityrights.org/ngoun98/ccpi.htm#part5> [CCPI].
28 BC Coalition of Women’s Centres, Media Advisory--Submission to United Nations Commit-
tee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (11 February 2002), online: <http://www3.telus.
net/bcwomen/archives/ICESCR_Feb_02.html>.
29 Ann Duffy and Nancy Mandell, “The Growth in Poverty and Social Inequality: Losing Faith 
in Social Justice”, in Dan Glenday and Ann Duffy, eds. Canadian Society (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) at 77 [Duffy].
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III. ACHIEVING PROTECTION THROUGH RIGHTS
In recent years, advocates have attempted to achieve constitutional pro-
tection for a minimum level of social assistance primarily through the 
vehicle of rights, both through the wholesale adoption of a charter of so-
cial and economic rights and the judicial interpretation of charter rights. 
Neither attempt has succeeded.
1. Social and Economic Rights
Representing “claims by individuals for an equitable share of economic 
and social resources”, social and economic rights were promoted main-
ly by “East Bloc and developing countries…as elements needed to stem 
the excesses of free-market economies and capitalism and to ensure 
equality of all participants”.30 Included in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948),31VRFLDODQGHFRQRPLFULJKWVDUHVSHFLÀFDOO\SUR-
tected in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) (1966).32 The right to a minimum level of assistance 
LVFRGLÀHGLQ$UWLFOHVDQGRIWKH,&(6&533 
In 1992, Canadians were asked to endorse the Charlottetown Ac-
cord, a set of proposals for constitutional amendment. One provision 
in the Accord dealt with the inclusion of a charter of social rights in the 
Canadian constitution.34 However, along with the rest of the Charlotte-
town Accord, the social union provision was discarded.35
30 Hugh M. Kindred, ed., International Law, 6th ed. (Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 2000) at 
781.
31 UDHR, supra note 9.
32 United Nations, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 16 De-
cember 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (registered H[RIÀFLR on 3 January 1976) [ICESCR].
33 Ibid. Article 9 of the ICESCR provides that: The States Parties to the present Covenant 
recognize the right of every one to social security, including social insurance; Article 11(1) of 
the ICESCR provides that: The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of 
everyone to a minimum standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Par-
ties will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect 
the essential importance of international co-operation based on free consent.
34 Joel Bakan, Just Words (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 135.
35 Ibid. 
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2. Judicial Interpretation of the Charter
As well as through the amendment process, individuals have tried to 
secure constitutional status for a minimum level of assistance through 
judicial interpretation of Charter rights. It has been argued that certain 
provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) 
and the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms should be in-
terpreted to include protection for a minimum level of assistance. Argu-
ments for inclusion have centered upon three provisions, namely sec-
tions 7 and 15 of the Charter, 36 and section 45 of the Quebec Charter. 
37 
As noted by the Charter Committee on Poverty Issues (CCPI), “s. 7 
is the lynch pin for constitutional protection of basic social and econom-
ic rights”.38 Consequently, “people in poverty…have been vigorously 
seeking to have section 7 interpreted consistently with the Covenant”.39 
For instance, in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), it was argued 
that “the section 7 right to security of the person includes the right to 
receive a particular level of social assistance from the state adequate to 
meet basic needs”.40 Louise Gosselin argued that the state deprived her 
RIWKLVULJKW´E\SURYLGLQJLQDGHTXDWHZHOIDUHEHQHÀWV«LQDZD\WKDW
violated the principles of fundamental justice”.41 
36 Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states that “Everyone: everyone 
has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof 
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice; while s. 15 states that: (1) 
Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and 
HTXDOEHQHÀWRIWKHODZZLWKRXWGLVFULPLQDWLRQDQGLQSDUWLFXODUZLWKRXWGLVFULPLQDWLRQEDVHG
on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. (2) 
Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the ameliora-
tion of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged 
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical dis-
ability. ” See the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
37 Section 45 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms provides that: every per-
VRQLQQHHGKDVDULJKWWR´PHDVXUHVRIÀQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHDQGWRVRFLDOPHDVXUHVSURYLGHGIRU
by law, susceptible of ensuring such person an acceptable standard of living”. See Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12, s. 45, cited in Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney Gen-
eral), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 429 at 85 [Gosselin].
38 CCPI, supra note 27.
39 CCPI, supra note 27.
40 Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 75. 
41 Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 75.
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The Court, through a narrow interpretation of section 7, rejected 
Gosselin’s claim. Firstly, McLachlin C.J. noted that “s. 7 does not pro-
tect against all measures that might in some way impinge on life, liberty 
or security, but only against those that can be attributed to state action 
implicating the administration of justice”.42 As interpreted by the Court, 
the harm to Gosselin did not occur as a result of her “interaction with 
the justice system and its administration”.43 Secondly, though acknowl-
edging that section 7 can be interpreted, in certain situations, to protect 
“economic rights fundamental to human…survival”, the Court held that 
this was not one of those situations. Thirdly, even if section 7 could be 
read to encompass economic rights, McLachlin C.J. noted that “nothing 
in the jurisprudence thus far suggests that section 7 places a positive 
obligation on the state to ensure that each person enjoys life, liberty or 
security of the person”.44 Instead, section 7 has been consistently seen 
as a negative right, restricting the state’s ability to deprive individuals 
of life, liberty, or security of the person. Though McLachlin C.J. leaves 
open the possibility that “a positive obligation to sustain life, liberty, or 
security of the person may be made out in special circumstances”, she 
maintains that the “frail [factual] platform” of this case does not meet 
those special circumstances.457KRXJKLWKDVQRWGHÀQLWLYHO\VWDWHGWKDW
it would not interpret section 7 as protecting a minimum level of assist-
ance, the Supreme Court of Canada has stopped short of providing any 
actual protection.46 
In certain situations, section 15, the equality rights provision of the 
Charter, has imposed positive obligations on governments to allocate 
resources to “alleviate disadvantages that exist independently of state 
action”.47 Such was the case in Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General), where the Supreme Court of Canada held that the “failure to 
provide sign language interpretation services under the provincial Medi-
cal and Health Care Services Act and Hospital Insurance Act violated 
42 Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 77.
43 Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 77.
44 Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 81.
45 Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 83.
46 Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 80.
47 Eldridge, supra note 15 at para. 73.
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the appellants’ Charter right to equality without discrimination based on 
physical disability”.48
As a result of Eldridge, it has been argued that the Charter “imposes 
positive obligations on governments to allocate resources and to im-
plement programmes to address social and economic disadvantage”.49 
However, this argument has not been successful in securing protection 
for a minimum level of assistance. As noted by the CCPI, it appears as 
if “the same narrow and restrictive interpretation which governments 
are arguing with respect to section 7 is happening in cases involving the 
equality guarantee in section 15 of the Charter”.50
Section 45 of the Quebec Charter provides that every person in need 
KDVDULJKWWR´PHDVXUHVRIÀQDQFLDODVVLVWDQFHDQGWRVRFLDOPHDVXUHV
provided for by law, susceptible of ensuring such person an acceptable 
standard of living”.51 In its construction, it is very similar to Article 11 of 
the ICESCR, which provides that every state has an “adequate core ob-
ligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, adequate essential 
levels of subsistence needs and the provision of basic services”.52 
In Gosselin, the court struggled between two competing interpreta-
tions of section 45. However, instead of holding that section 45 gives 
courts the ability to review the adequacy of social assistance measures, 
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase “susceptible of ensur-
ing…an acceptable standard of living” allows the court only to specify 
“the kind of measures the state is obliged to provide…and cannot ground 
a review of their adequacy”.53 
In 1998, the CCPI stated that “the Charter is the tool which the poor 
and other equality seekers are looking to in order to guarantee the legal 
protections contemplated by the Covenant”.54 However, the Charter, and 
rights discourse more generally, has not been effective. Canadian courts 
have “routinely opt[ed] for an interpretation which excludes protection 
48 CCPI, supra note 27.
49 CCPI, supra note 27.
50 CCPI, supra note 27.
51 Gosselin, supra note 37 at para. 85.
52 ICESCR, supra note 32.
53 Gosselin, supra note 37 at paras. 87, 88.
54 CCPI, supra note 27.
ALTERNATIVES TO RIGHTS . . . 175 
to a minimum standard of living and other Covenant rights”.55 True 
progress towards a minimum level of assistance has yet to be achieved 
through rights. 
IV. SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE TO RIGHTS
It is possible that the failure of rights discourse to achieve constitutional 
protection for a minimum level of assistance stems from a reluctance 
to guarantee the normative content of the right. That is to say, perhaps 
Canadians simply don’t believe that governments should take steps to 
satisfy the basic needs of their citizens. In this case, as citizens and the 
courts object to the fact of protection itself, the search for a new tool 
with which to guarantee protection would be futile. 
However, this position is inconsistent with Canada’s history as a so-
cial welfare state. Throughout the 20th century, Canadian governments 
have instituted social programs that extol, as their goal, the satisfaction 
of the basic needs of the individual. To many, the programs created in 
support of this goal “are considered part of the panoply of rights and 
privileges attaching to Canadian citizenship”.56 
Thus, it appears as if the issue could be institutional, and not norma-
tive. Canadians don’t necessarily disagree with the concept of protecting 
a minimum level of assistance. Instead, their resistance may be centered 
on the institutional expression of this concept through rights. Such an 
issue is uncommon in constitutional law. Generally, when protection is 
sought for an interest, debate focuses upon whether the interest merits 
protection, and not whether the institutional form in which the interest 
is presented is acceptable.57 
Recognizing the importance of achieving constitutional protection, 
and in the effort to continue debate, an alternative approach to that of 
rights must be found. In attempting to reach a solution, it is helpful 
55 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, “Concluding Obser-
vations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right--Canada” in Consideration 
of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Articles 16 and 17 of the Covenant, (4 December 
1998) at para. 15. online: <http://www.web.net/~ngoun98/conclud98.htm>.
56 Social Justice, supra note 12 at 4.
57 One example is the debate surrounding the inclusion of pornography within the right to free-
dom of speech.
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to turn to countries who have managed to solve a similar problem, in 
order to determine whether their reasoning can apply in the Canadian 
context.
V. THE HUNGARIAN BENEFITS CASE
1. Background 
In the fall of 1989, Hungary58HQWHUHGLWVÀQDOWUDQVLWLRQLQWRERWKDSDU-
liamentary democracy59 and a free market economy.60 Struggling under 
the weight of an enormous internal and foreign debt, Hungary was vul-
nerable to pressure from foreign lending institutions and organizations 
like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union 
(EU).61 
For a period of time, the Hungarian government resisted the urge 
to curb state socialist spending practices.62+RZHYHUDVWKHGHÀFLWLQ-
creased, the welfare system began to be seen less as “an important reme-
dy helping the government…smooth the social and political transition”, 
and more as a “major source of budgetary problems, incorporating cost-
ly and wasteful subsystems that impose a heavy burden on the economy 
and constrain its growth potential”.63 
In 1995, faced with the reality that “servicing the debt risked plung-
ing the country into bankruptcy”, the socialist government introduced a 
comprehensive economic emergency plan (the Economic Stabilization 
Act).64 The major thrust of this plan was: 
58 It should be noted that Hungary has a civil law system. 
595XGROI/7ŃNpVHungary’s Negotiated Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) at 361 [Tokes].
60 United States of America, Central Intelligence Agency, Hungary, online: The World Factbook 
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/hu.html>.
61 Andras Sajo, “How the Rule of Law Killed Hungarian Welfare Reform” (1996) 5:1 East 
European Constitutional Review, reprinted in Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Comparative 
Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 1999) 1465 at 1469 [Sajo].
62 Ibid.
63 László Halpern and Charles Wyplosz, eds., Hungary: Towards a Market Economy (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998) at 335 [Halpern].
64 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1469.
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a substantial cut in the government’s expenditures on welfare 
EHQHÀWVSHQVLRQDOORZDQFHVHGXFDWLRQDQGKHDOWKFDUHLQRUGHUWR
UHGXFH+XQJDU\·V HQRUPRXVEXGJHWGHÀFLW DQG IRUHLJQGHEW7KLV
austerity package curbed social spending by explicitly tightening 
eligibility rules and the quality of welfare programmes.65 
While the Act was being debated, concerned Hungarian citizens submit-




Constitutional Court reviewed the case (dubbed the Hungarian Ben-
HÀWV&DVH) with “exceptional urgency”, determining that some welfare 
changes could not enter into force because they lacked an adequate ad-
justment period, and that other restrictions were “unconstitutional and 
void per se, irrespective of their date of entry into force”.68
2. Logic of the Hungarian Constitutional Court
Article 70/E of the Hungarian Constitution gives Hungarian citizens the 
right to social assistance.69 In earlier cases, the Constitutional Court in-
terpreted this right as guaranteeing only subsistence-level care.70 The 
Economic Stabilization Act annulled or altered programs above the level 
of subsistence protection. It did not challenge subsistence-level protec-
tion itself.71 Thus, in analyzing the constitutionality of the proposed cuts 
65 Halpern, supra note 63 at 301.
66&UHDWHGLQ-DQXDU\DVWKHÀUVWLQVWLWXWLRQFUHDWHGE\+XQJDU\·VQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQWR
assume its responsibilities
67 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, 43/1995 (VL30) AB Decision, [1997] 4 E. Eur. Case Rep. Const. L. 
64 (Hungarian Constitutional Court), reprinted in Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet, Compara-
tive Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 1999) 1452 [+XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH].
68 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1470.
69 Article 70/E of the Hungarian Constitution provides that: (1) Citizens of the Republic of 
Hungary have the right to social security; they are entitled to the support required to live in old 
age, and in the case of sickness, disability, being widowed or orphaned and in the case of unem-
ployment through no fault of their own. (2) The Republic of Hungary shall implement the right 
to social support through the social security system and the system of social institutions. See 
Hungary, Constitution, online: <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/hu00000_.html>.
70 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1472.
71 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1472.
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to social services, the Constitutional Court could not rely on the concept 
RIVRFLDOULJKWVDVFRGLÀHGLQ$UWLFOH(,QVWHDGWKH+XQJDULDQ&RQ-
stitutional Court based its decision on the principles of legal certainty, 
legitimate expectations, and property protection. In so doing, the court 
managed to protect programs threatened by the Economic Stabilization 
Act without turning to the language of rights. 
According to the Hungarian Constitutional Court, the government, 
E\SDVVLQJVRFLDOZHOIDUHOHJLVODWLRQJUDQWLQJEHQHÀWVWRIDPLOLHVJHQ-
erated legitimate expectations of welfare support.72 As a result of these 
EHQHÀWV DQG WKHLU UHODWHG H[SHFWDWLRQV IDPLOLHVPDGH VLJQLÀFDQW OLIH
choices. For instance, a family may have decided that they could af-
ford to have a second child based on the allowances and fees generated 
IURP IDPLO\ FKLOG FDUH SUHJQDQF\ DQGPDWHUQLW\ EHQHÀWV7KLV V\V-
WHPRIEHQHÀWVWKXV´SOD\HGDVXEVWDQWLDOUROHLQWKHOLYHOLKRRGRIIDPL-
lies”.73 With the passage of the Economic Stabilization Act, many social 
ZHOIDUHEHQHÀWVXSRQZKLFKIDPLOLHVKDGEDVHGVLJQLÀFDQWOLIHFKRLFHV
would disappear. As a result, the legitimate expectations of thousands of 
Hungarian families would be violated. 
The Court states that the violation of these legitimate expectations 
defeats the principle of legal certainty, “the most substantial conceptual 
element of a constitutional state and the theoretical basis for acquired 
rights”.74$VDUHVXOWLWLVRI´H[FHSWLRQDOVLJQLÀFDQFHIURPWKHYLHZ-
SRLQWRIWKHVWDELOLW\RIWKHZHOIDUHEHQHÀWV\VWHPVµ75 In the interest of 
OHJDOFHUWDLQW\LWZDVKHOGWKDWWKHEHQHÀWVDQGWKHLUUHODWHGH[SHFWDWLRQV
FRXOGQRWEH´DOWHUHGFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ZLWKRXWVXIÀFLHQWUHDVRQRURYHU-
night”.76 The Constitutional Court noted that:
it is a requirement adequate to the constitutional state…that the 
behaviour of the State be calculable, so that both natural and legal 
persons be able to plan with good grounds in making their economic- 
or family- or livelihood-related decisions and that they be able to 
infer the will of the State incorporated into legal relations.77
72 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1472.
73 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1453.
74 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1456.
75 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1456.
76 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1456.
77 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1461.
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,QRUGHUWRDOORZIDPLOLHVWRDGMXVWWKHLUOLYHVWRWKHQHZEHQHÀWV\VWHP
the Court ordered the institution of a transition period before certain so-
FLDOZHOIDUHEHQHÀWVFDQEHZLWKGUDZQ$VQRWHGE\6DMR´LWLVQRWFOHDU
from the Court’s decision how long expectations are to be respected”.78 
It could potentially be years before the Hungarian government is per-
PLWWHGWRDGMXVWLWVEHQHÀWSURJUDPV
Furthermore, in its decision, the Hungarian Constitutional Court ad-
GUHVVHV WKH UHGXFWLRQRUZLWKGUDZDO RI VRFLDOZHOIDUHEHQHÀWV IHDWXU-
ing a mandatory insurance component. Through mandatory insurance, 
the state draws assets from the individual which the individual could 
have otherwise used to protect his/her family, and places these assets in 
the service of social security based on the principle of solidarity.79 The 
Constitutional Court states that the constitutionality of the “reduction 
RUWHUPLQDWLRQµRIWKHVHEHQHÀWVVKDOOEHGHWHUPLQHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKH
criteria of “protection of property”.80 Sajo notes that in the Hungarian 
constitutional context: 
SURSHUW\ SURWHFWLRQ PHDQV D ÁDW SURKLELWLRQ RQ WDNLQJV«WRGD\·V
OHJLVODWLRQ FDQQRW FKDQJH LQ D IXQGDPHQWDO ZD\ VRFLDO EHQHÀWV
promised by earlier legislation, unless the legislature can prove to 
the Court that the taking serves the public interest and only if there 
is full and immediate compensation.81
$VDUHVXOWLQWKHFDVHRIVRFLDOVHFXULW\EHQHÀWVZLWKDQLQVXUDQFH
FRPSRQHQW WKH OHJLVODWXUHPD\ QRW UHPRYH SURPLVHG EHQHÀWV XQOHVV
full compensation is provided. As Sajo states, “such compensation is 
highly unlikely”.82 
78 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1473.
79 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1461.
80 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1461.
81 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1471.
82 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1471.
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VI. APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF THE HUNGARIAN BENEFITS 
CASE TO CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE
The Hungarian Constitutional Court, in determining the constitutionality 
of the Economic Stabilization Act, circumvented social rights by basing 
its decision on the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, 
and property protection. Perhaps the application of these principles will 
help Canadian courts shake their reliance on rights, allowing the con-
stitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance to be achieved 
through other institutional means. 
In Canada, there has been the growth of a “public expectation that 
the state meet [the] basic needs of its citizens as a matter of legal obli-
gation”.83 While recognizing that governments maintain the ability to 
adjust social programs, Canadians expect that social services will re-
main, at the very least, at the minimum level of assistance. Applying 
the principles from the +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVHit can be argued that if 
JRYHUQPHQWZLWKGUDZDORIVRFLDOVHUYLFHVDQGEHQHÀWVFDXVHVDVVLVWDQFH
to fall below this level, the legitimate expectations of Canadians will be 
violated, thus defeating the principle of legal certainty. Social services 
with an element of mandatory insurance could potentially be buttressed 
with a greater degree of protection due to their contributory element. 
In analyzing whether the principles utilized in Hungary can apply in 
&DQDGDWKLVSDSHUZLOOEHJLQÀUVWE\DGGUHVVLQJOHJDOFHUWDLQW\
1. Legal certainty
As noted above, in the +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVHthe Hungarian Con-
stitutional Court declared that “legal certainty…is the most substantial 
conceptual element of a constitutional state”.84 The Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court invalidated the Economic Stabilization Act largely because 
by passing the Act, the government would defeat the principle of legal 
certainty. 
In Canadian jurisprudence, “legal certainty”, far from being the most 
substantial conceptual element of the Canadian constitutional state, is a 
83 Social Justice, supra note 12 at 4.
84 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1456.
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minor concept. Legal certainty is referred to only twice by the Supreme 
Court of Canada, both references occurring in the context of preferring 
written over unwritten constitutions. In the Quebec Secession Reference, 
the Court notes that “a written constitution promotes legal certainty and 
predictability”.85 In the Reference re: Remuneration of the Judges of the 
Provincial Court, the Court states that there are “many important rea-
sons for the preference for a written constitution over an unwritten one, 
not the least of which is the promotion of legal certainty and through it 
the legitimacy of constitutional judicial review”.86 
Using this limited Canadian jurisprudence, it could be argued that 
OHJLVODWLRQJUDQWLQJEHQHÀWVWRLQGLYLGXDOVDQGIDPLOLHVSURPRWHVOHJDO
certainty and predictability. Just as a written constitution helps individu-
DOVSUHGLFWWKHLUULJKWVDQGREOLJDWLRQVEHQHÀWJUDQWLQJOHJLVODWLRQKHOSV
individuals predict government behaviour, thus allowing individuals to 
plan important life decisions. As a result, it could be argued that in or-
der to promote legal certainty, an adjustment period must be instituted 
EHIRUHEHQHÀWJUDQWLQJOHJLVODWLRQLVDPHQGHG7KLVDUJXPHQWZDVVXF-
cessful in Hungary. However, in Canada, such an argument would run 
FRXQWHUWRWKHSULQFLSOHRISDUOLDPHQWDU\VRYHUHLJQW\´UHÁHFWHGLQVHF-
tion 42(1) of the federal Interpretation Act, which states that ‘every Act 
shall be construed as to reserve to Parliament the power of repealing or 
amending it’”.87 As a result, this argument, as was the case in Reference 
Re: Canada Assistance Plan, would likely be dismissed. 
Nevertheless, in Vriend v. Alberta, the Supreme Court of Canada 
cited with approval a passage by William Black in “Vriend, Rights, 
and Democracy”, which stated that “democracy requires that all citi-
zens be allowed to participate in the democratic process, either directly 
or through equal consideration by their representatives. Parliamentary 
sovereignty is a means to this end, not an end in itself”.88 
Individuals cannot participate in public affairs if they are living un-
der the dictate of necessity. Thus, while parliamentary sovereignty is 
a means through which individuals may participate in the democratic 
process, the satisfaction of necessity is a pre-condition to this participa-
85 Reference Re: Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 at para. 53.
86 Reference Re: Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 93.
87 Reference Re: Canada Assistance Plan (B.C.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 525 at headnote [CAP].
88 Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at para. 174 [Vriend].
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tion. Before the principle of parliamentary sovereignty can be applied, 
WKHGLFWDWHRIQHFHVVLW\PXVWEHVDWLVÀHG
Consequently, notwithstanding the principle of parliamentary sov-
ereignty, the court could use the principle of legal certainty to invalidate 
legislation cutting social services below the adequate level of assistance. 
In this situation, “where the interests of a minority [the poverty collec-
tive] have been denied consideration…judicial intervention is warrant-
ed to correct a democratic process that has acted improperly”.89 If this 
is argument is accepted by the court, an exception could be carved out 
RIVHFWLRQVWDWLQJWKDW$FWVJUDQWLQJEHQHÀWVWRYXOQHUDEOHJURXSV
shall not be repealed or amended if doing so would cause social assist-
ance to fall below the minimum level. 
2. Legitimate expectations
In the +XQJDULDQ %HQHÀWV &DVH the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
KHOGWKDWWKHOHJLVODWXUHE\SDVVLQJEHQHÀWJUDQWLQJOHJLVODWLRQFUHDWHG
legitimate expectations of social support for its citizens. As a result of 
these legitimate expectations, the government could not withdraw cer-
WDLQEHQHÀWVXQWLODQDGHTXDWHWUDQVLWLRQSHULRGKDGH[SLUHG
In seeking to provide Canadian constitutional protection for a mini-
mum level of assistance, it could be argued that the Canadian govern-
ment, by virtue of the fact that it is an advanced modern welfare state 
ZLWKDKLVWRU\RILQVWLWXWLQJVRFLDOSURJUDPVDQGDZHERIEHQHÀWJUDQW-
ing legislation, created legitimate expectations that it would provide for 
the basic needs of its citizens. As a result of these legitimate expecta-
tions, the government would not be permitted to set social services at 
rates below the minimum level of assistance. 
However, such an argument would be problematic given the current 
state of the Canadian doctrine of legitimate expectations. In Canada, 
WKH´SURFHVVRIHVWDEOLVKLQJDOHJLWLPDWHH[SHFWDWLRQFODLPLVDGLIÀFXOW
one, and claims are not often successful”.90 Originally a British con-
cept designed for administrative law, legitimate expectations was used 
89 Ibid. at para. 176.
90 David Wright, “Rethinking the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectations in Canadian Administra-
tive Law” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 140 at 185 [Wright].
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to extend the situations in which the duty of fairness is owed.91 Though 
the Supreme Court of Canada integrated the British concept into Cana-
dian law, “its judgments have…considerably restricted the situations in 
which it applies”.92
The Canadian doctrine was severely limited with the Court’s de-
cision in Reference Re: Canada Assistance Plan. Under the Canada 
Assistance Plan (CAP), the federal government concluded agreements 
with the provinces to pay half of the provinces’ eligible expenditures for 
social assistance. The agreement was open to amendment or termination 
by mutual consent, or could be terminated on one year’s notice from 
either party. In 1990, the federal government, seeking to reduce the fed-
HUDOEXGJHWGHÀFLWXQLODWHUDOO\FXWH[SHQGLWXUHVDQGOLPLWHGWKHJURZWK
of payments made to British Columbia, Alberta, and Ontario under the 
Canada Assistance Plan. It did not give one year’s notice before amend-
ing the agreement. 93
The Government of British Columbia argued that “the agreement 
gave the province a legitimate expectation that it would be consulted 
and its consent would be obtained before changes were made to the 
agreement, unless the one year’s notice was given”.94 This argument, 
though accepted by the Court of Appeal, was rejected by the Supreme 
Court of Canada on the basis that the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
does not apply to legislative decisions and that it cannot be used to cre-
ate substantive rights. 
Given the CAP decision, the use of the Canadian doctrine of legiti-
mate expectations to achieve constitutional protection for a minimum 
level of assistance is problematic. Firstly, many cuts to social services 
occur through acts of the legislature. For instance, in CAP, withdrawals 
to the CAP plan were embodied in the Government Expenditures Re-
straint Act.95 As a result, these cuts are presumptively out of reach of the 
doctrine. David Wright, in “Rethinking the Doctrine of Legitimate Ex-
SHFWDWLRQVLQ&DQDGLDQ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH/DZµGLVFXVVHVWKHMXVWLÀFDWLRQ
for restricting the doctrine to administrative functions, noting that “the 
introduction of legislation [is] a fundamental part of the legislative proc-
91 Ibid. at 141. 
92 Ibid. at 140-141.
93 CAP, supra note 87 at headnote.
94 Wright, supra note 90 at 168.
95 CAP, supra note 87 at headnote.
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ess, and using the doctrine of legitimate expectations to restrict would 
interfere with Parliamentary sovereignty”.96 
However, as discussed in the context of legal certainty, there are 
certain situations when it is legitimate to restrict Parliamentary sover-
eignty. As noted above, the protection of a minimum level of assistance 
is one such situation. Though unlikely, it may be possible to create an 
exception to the principle that the doctrine of legitimate expectations 
applies only to legislative acts in order to protect a minimum level of 
assistance.
The requirement that legitimate expectations cannot be used to create 
VXEVWDQWLYHULJKWVSRVHVDPRUHGLIÀFXOWFKDOOHQJH,Q+XQJDU\FLWL]HQV
had a legitimate expectation of a substantive right: the public expected 
WKDW EHQHÀWVZRXOG QRW EH WHUPLQDWHGZLWKRXW DQ DGHTXDWH WUDQVLWLRQ
SHULRG,Q&DQDGDDVFRQÀUPHGLQCAP, the termination of government 
EHQHÀWVZRXOG IDOO RXWVLGH RI WKH VFRSH RI WKH GRFWULQH RI OHJLWLPDWH
expectations. Due to the fact that, in Canada, the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations cannot be used to create substantive rights, advocates of 
a minimum level of assistance would not be able to use the doctrine to 
prevent the government from setting social assistance rates at a below-
subsistence level.
Nevertheless, Wright notes that the “focus on the fact that substan-
tive legitimate expectations are not protected in [Canada] has obscured 
the possibility that the promise of a substantive result could give rise to 
procedural protections”.97 Such an argument, though it has been raised 
by “few plaintiffs in Canadian legitimate expectation cases”, could 
DFKLHYHEHQHÀFLDOUHVXOWVIRUSURSRQHQWVRIWKHSURWHFWLRQRIDPLQLPXP
level of assistance.98 Though ineffective in stopping governments from 
withdrawing social services, it could be held that the implied promise by 
Canadian governments to satisfy the basic needs of its citizens gives rise 
to enhanced procedural protections when governments contemplate set-
ting social assistance rates below the level of subsistence. Such a result 
would mandate the participation of and consultation with the poverty 
FROOHFWLYHLQVSHFLÀFVLWXDWLRQV́ LQRUGHUWRHQVXUHWKDWDGHPRFUDWLFGH-
cision is made which also takes into account the interests of those with 
96 Wright, supra note 90.
97 Wright, supra note 90 at 181.
98 Wright, supra note 90 at 181.
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a greater interest in its outcome than the average citizen”.99 The ability 
of the doctrine of legitimate expectations to create a right to “make rep-
UHVHQWDWLRQVRUWREHFRQVXOWHGµLVFRQÀUPHGLQCAP.100
In addition to the possibility of securing enhanced procedural pro-
tections through the doctrine of legitimate expectations, Wright also 
suggests that courts extend the review for fairness in the case of del-
egated legislation in order to ensure that “those whose lives or activities 
are affected by a decision have the opportunity to be consulted”.101 As 
noted earlier, the poverty collective has no resources or political power. 
7KXVXQDEOHWRLQÁXHQFHGHFLVLRQPDNHUVWKHLUYLHZVFDQEHHDVLO\GLV-
regarded. It is submitted that in Canada, the review for fairness should 
be extended to the poverty collective in situations where the legislature 
is contemplating decreasing assistance to below-subsistence rates. As 
Wright notes:
:KLOHODUJHEHQHÀWFXWVPD\EHFRQVLGHUHGWREHLQWKHEURDG́ SXEOLF
interest”, certain people bear the brunt of these decisions, and it is 
crucial to require some consultation with them when the decisions 
are being made. At the very least, this is because people have 
planned their lives based on the existing state of affairs. Welfare 
recipients, for example, have signed leases and made budgeting 
decisions on the basis of the amount of assistance being provided. 
Without consultation, these special needs may be ignored by the 
delegated decisionmaker. Although there may have been no clear 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVWRWKHVHJURXSVWKDWWKHLUEHQHÀWVZRXOGUHPDLQDWD
certain level for a certain time, the special needs of people in these 
situations are at least as important as those to whom representations 
have been made.102 
Though the Canadian doctrine of legitimate expectations would not al-
low courts to invalidate legislation simply on the basis that it breached 
an implied promise that assistance would not be cut below the level of 
subsistence, courts may read in a duty to consult. This duty would not 
prevent the legislature from cutting social services. However, it would, 
at the very least, ensure the presence of the poverty collective during 
99 Wright, supra note 90 at 189.
100 CAP, supra note 87 at para. 59.
101 Wright, supra note 90 at 191.
102 Wright, supra note 90 at 192.
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negotiations. For a vulnerable group who has been overlooked and dis-
regarded, the opportunity to have one’s voice heard is an important step 
forward.
3. Property protection
In addition to the principles of legal certainty and legitimate expecta-
tions, the Hungarian Constitutional Court applied the concepts of man-
datory insurance and property protection in order to invalidate legislation 
WHUPLQDWLQJVRFLDOEHQHÀWV$VQRWHGDERYHLQ+XQJDU\VRFLDOVHFXULW\
EHQHÀWVZLWKDPDQGDWRU\LQVXUDQFHFRPSRQHQWFDQEHUHPRYHGRQO\LI
“the legislature can prove to the Court that the taking serves the public 
interest and only if there is full and immediate compensation”.103 
Due to historical differences between the two nations, the principle 
of property protection would not likely advance the cause of Canadian 
constitutional protection of a minimum level of assistance. In Hungary, 
private property is seen as “an important guarantee of personal auton-
omy”.104 In response to the eradication of private property by former 
Communist governments, the Hungarian Constitution “protects the 
right to property as the traditional material base of individual autonomy 
in action”.105
A strong connection has been forged in Hungary between property 
and social services. Laszlo Solyom, former Chief Justice of the Hungar-
ian Constitutional Court, stated in a 1993 concurring opinion that “in or-
der to assure the autonomy-granting function of property, the functional 
equivalent of property, namely, welfare entitlement, should also receive 
property-like protection”.106 
In Canada, early charter critics were concerned that property protec-
tion could be used to “thwart governments from redistributing property 
rights or economic entitlements, as had occurred in the United States 
in the early years of the twentieth century”.107 Thus, while in Hungary, 
constitutional property protection is seen as a necessary tool in the pres-
103 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1471.
104 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1471.
105 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1458.
106 Sajo, supra note 61 at 1471.
107 Patrick Monahan, Constitutional Law, 2nd ed. (2002) (QL).
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ervation of social services, in Canada, constitutional property protection 
is seen as a possible threat to social services, programs, and vulnerable 
minorities. As a result, it was intentionally omitted from the Charter. 
Furthermore, it has limited application in attempting to secure constitu-
tional protection for a minimal level of assistance. 
However, an argument can be made for a Canadian application of 
the Hungarian principle of property protection. In both Canada and 
Hungary, the majority of citizens are not “self-pensioners…it is not 
their own material goods that constitute social and economic security 
in their inactive age; they live in a way that they invest a part of the 
result of their work in social security”.108 In Hungary, due to the close 
connection between property and social services, it was held that since 
WKHEHQHÀWV´SHUIRUPWKHIXQFWLRQRIJXDUDQWHHLQJVHFXULW\RISURSHUW\
taken stricto sensu, law must provide for a security comparable to that 
of property”.109 
It is possible that for certain services, the same result could be found 
in Canada. Canadians must submit a portion of their income to the 
Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and Unemployment Insurance (UI). These 
contributions could be interpreted by a court as “mandatory insurance”. 
7KXVDQ\VXEVWDQWLDOFXWVWR&33RU8,EHQHÀWSURJUDPVFRXOGEHLQYDO-
idated due to the Hungarian principle of property protection. However, 
given the historical interaction between property and social services in 
Canada, it is unlikely that this result would be found. 
VII. CONCLUSION
It is crucial for Canada to achieve constitutional protection for a mini-
mum level of social assistance. Without such protection, a substantial 
portion of Canadian society will continue to live in abject poverty, with-
out rights, and without the ability to participate in democratic discourse. 
If protection is not achieved, a vulnerable group, the poverty collective, 
will continue to have its interests overlooked and its needs neglected. 
Without protection, the deliberative democratic ideal of full authorship 
108 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1458.
109 +XQJDULDQ%HQHÀWV&DVH, supra note 67 at 1458-9.
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will continue to be overwhelmed by the concept of authorship by those 
who can afford to participate.110 
Attempts have been made to achieve constitutional protection for 
this minimum standard through the language of rights. These attempts 
have failed. Given the importance of achieving protection for a mini-
mum level of assistance, it is necessary to take another path, to explore 
each and every alternative until a solution is found. Proceeding solely 
through the language of rights risks exhausting debate. Over time, if the 
same arguments continue to be circulated and rejected, conversation will 
FHDVH7KLVFDQQRWEHWKHFDVH7RRPXFKGHSHQGVRQÀQGLQJDQDQVZHU
to the social question, on protecting a minimum level of assistance.
This paper attempted to take another path, to seek the constitutional 
protection of a minimum level of assistance through means other than 
rights. It did so by analyzing a jurisdiction that managed to protect so-
cial needs without resorting to the language of rights. However, the non-
rights based concepts used in Hungary to protect social programs are 
not directly applicable to the Canadian context. 
Though arguments have been made, in each case, for the applica-
bility of the principles of legal certainty, legitimate expectations, and 
SURSHUW\SURWHFWLRQD&DQDGLDQFRXUWZRXOGOLNHO\ÀQGWKHPOHJDOO\XQ-
persuasive. In all probability, the solution to achieving a constitutionally 
protected minimum level of assistance will not be found in the pages of 
this paper. However, the analysis itself still has value. 
The act of searching outside of the language of rights for a solution 
to the problem of necessity helps subvert contemporary reliance on the 
rights-based approach. It does so through the creation of an “autocriti-
cal” moment.111 By demonstrating that there is potentially more than one 
path through which to provide constitutional protection for a minimum 
level of assistance, this autocritical moment allows for the proliferation 
of alternative sites of participation. Perhaps a South American court has 
taken a different path towards a minimum level of assistance. Maybe an 
alternative route can be found in municipal records in Geneva. Perhaps 
the answer will be found in future decisions by the Hungarian Constitu-
tional Court. With this proliferation of alternatives, discourse expands, 
110 Michelman, supra note 11 at 148.
111 Michelman, supra note 11 at 166.
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conversation increases, and Canadian society draws closer to the ideal 
of deliberative democracy. 
Conversation is not enough. However, through conversation, atten-
tion is brought to the issue of a minimum level of assistance. As long as 
conversation continues, the issue will not slip away. As long as solutions 
are proposed, the legislature and the courts will not be able to disregard 
the poverty collective.
